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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Program is a system that
provides for the partial sharing of the commercial-industrial
property tax base among all jurisdictions within a metropolitan
area. First implemented in 1975, the Minneapolis-St. Paul (Twin
t
Myron Orfield is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
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tt
Nicholas Wallace is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Race and Poverty,
University of Minnesota.
1. Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan Revenue Distribution Act of July 23,
1971, ch. 473F, 1971 Minn. Laws 2286 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §
473F.01 (2004)). See also Tax-Base Pool Bill Advances, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, June 2,
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Cities) area is the only region in the United States where tax-base
sharing has been attempted. 2 Created by the Minnesota Fiscal
Disparities Act of 1971 as an alternative to annexation and
consolidation of local governments, the Twin Cities tax-basesharing program was an attempt to respond to a number of
concerns, including increasing property tax rates, tax-base and taxrate
disparities,
and interjurisdictional
competition
for
4
development.
The Twin Cities program requires each taxing jurisdiction in a
seven-county area to contribute to a regional pool forty percent of5
the growth in the value of its commercial-industrial tax capacity.
Municipalities are assigned a portion of that pool, based on
population and the ratio of the total market value of property per
capita in the jurisdiction
S 6 to the average market value of property
per capita in the region. The formula assigns a share of the pool
that is greater than a locality's population proportion to
municipalities with lower-than-average market value per capita;
whereas high-market-value localities receive a lower portion than
their population share.7
The Twin Cities metropolitan region has benefited from taxbase sharing by reducing incentives for fiscal zoning and tax-base
competition and associated negative outcomes." The program
ensures that all residents enjoy a minimum standard of service for
important local services like public safety.9 By reducing the need
1971, at IA.

2. STEVE HINZE & KAREN BAKER, HOUSE RES. DEP'T, MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, MINNESOTA'S FISCAL DISPARITIES PROGRAMS:
TWIN CITIES
METROPOLITAN AREA & IRON RANGE 1 (2005), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/
hrd/pubs/fiscaldis.pdf. Minnesota added a smaller tax-base sharing program in
the Iron Range section of northern Minnesota in 1996. Id. at 35. The Iron Range
program, modeled after the metropolitan area program, covers what is known as
the "taconite relief area" and is codified in Minnesota Statutes, chapter 276A. Id.
3. Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan Revenue Distribution Act of July 23,
1971, ch. 473F, 1971 Minn. Laws 2286 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. §
473F.01 (2004)).
4. MINN. STAT. § 473F.01 subdiv. 1 (2004).
5. HINZE & BAKER, supra note 2, at 11 (identifing 1971 as the beginning of
the program).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 11-12.
8. See UNIV. OF MICH.: TAUBMAN C. OF ARCHITECTURE & URB. PLAN., URB. &
REGIONAL PLANNING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK (2005).
9.
MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND

STABILITY 84-85 (1997) [hereinafter METROPOLITICS].
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for local governments to "steal" revenue-generating land uses from
each other, such policies allow them to engage in more thoughtful
and beneficial land-use planning.' 0 By reducing tax disparitiestherefore leveling the playing field in the tax-base competitionthese policies encourage reinvestment in the central city and other
fiscally stressed communities." The result reduces the growth of
those disparities.
Despite the benefits for the region as a whole, the passage of
Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971 (Act) wasnot a simple task.
Debates that pitted cities versus suburbs, wealthy districts versus
poorer districts, and party members versus fellow party members
highlighted tensions that almost defeated passage of the Act. The
Act's ultimate success required a "unique coalition of central-city
and suburban legislators" working toether to ensure the future
economic vitality of the entire state.
This article reviews the
legislative and political history of the Twin Cities Fiscal Disparities
Program, benefits of tax-base sharing, and arguments for the
adoption of tax-base sharing in other metropolitan areas.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF MINNESOTA'S TAXBASE SHARING

A.
Voting in the House: Failure,Success, and "Metropolitan
Socialism"
The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971 was part of the
larger property tax reforms passed in 1971 known as the
"Minnesota Miracle." The Minnesota Miracle was the culmination
of ten years of efforts to restructure Minnesota fiscal policy. As best
summarized by the Minnesota Historical Society:
Rising public discontent with soaring property taxes
created the ferment for the needed reform of long10. See id. at 94-95.
11. Seeid.at96-97.
12. Peter Ackerburg, Not Understood, Fiscal Disparity Proposal Delayed,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 17, 1971, at 14B.
13. Paul A. Gilje, Minnesota's Metropolitan Tax Pool, 5 CITY (Nat'l Urban Coal.,
Wash. D.C.), Fall 1971, at 50. See also MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS:
THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 106 (2002) [hereinafter AMERICAN METROPOLITICS].

14. Minnesota Historical Society, History Topics: Public Education-The
Minnesota Miracle, http://www.mnhs.org/library/tips/history-topics/18public
.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
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established policies: local governments and school
districts were financed solely through autonomously
levied property taxes; municipalities were forced to
compete for commercial-industrial development to boost
their tax base; and disparities in the quality of education
between property-tax-rich and property-tax-poor districts
were egregious. Reform laws enacted to resolve those
issues, taken together, came to be known as the Minnesota
Miracle of 1971.
Led by Paul Gilje (then research director of the Citizens
League), Representative Charles R. Weaver of Anoka, the newly
formed Metropolitan Council, the 1967-1971 Republican
legislatures, and state Senator Wendell Anderson (the future
governor) of the Democrat-Farmer-Labor party (DFL), the
Minnesota Miracle was a bipartisan achievement that resulted in
the creation of local government aid (LGA) 6 The Minnesota
Miracle legislation shifted the majority of education funding from
local property tax levies to the state. 17 This change brought
property tax relief while increasing income and state sales taxes.
Gilje, also a former Minneapolis Star reporter, first chronicled
the efforts to bring tax-base sharing to Minnesota in his 1971
article, "Minnesota's Metropolitan Tax Pool."'9 Gilje credits F.
15. Id.
16. Id. Initially providing aid to a variety of local governments, currently LGA
only extends funds to cities. House Res. Dep't, Minn. House of Representatives,
The History of the City Local Government Aid (LGA) Program, http://www.house.leg.
state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/histlga.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). LGA has two
components: base aid and formula aid. Id. Base aid, also known as the
"grandfathered" aid, is equal to the amount of aid a city received in 1993 in LGA
and other aid programs. Id. Base aid usually does not grow unless specifically
provided for in legislation. Id.
Formula aid is based on a city's unmet needs. Id. This refers to the
difference between a city's needs and its ability to pay. Id. Four factors determine
a city's needs in the formula: population, population decrease, percentage of its
housing built before 1940, and percentage of its tax base that is commercial or
industrial. Id. A city's ability to pay is equal in the formula to the city's tax
capacity multiplied by the average city tax rate. Id.
A city's LGA payment may not be less than its base aid amount in any
given year. Id. The percent increase in LGA payments to the cities of
Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth may not exceed the percent increase in the total
LGA appropriation for that year. Id. The LGA increase for any other city may not
exceed ten percent of the city's property tax levy in the previous year. Id.
17. See Minnesota Historical Society, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. See Gilje, supranote 13, at 49.
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Warren Preeshl, a suburban school board member in 1968 and a
staunch advocate of local government, with conceiving of the
"unique idea of tax-base sharing as a way to keep decisions local but
still overcome the problems of concentration of the tax base in
certain communities as against others." 0 At the time, Preeshl was a
member of the fiscal disparities committee of the Citizens League. 21
In early 1969, the Citizens League adopted Preeshl's tax-base
sharing idea via a report presented to the legislature. 22 Rep.
Charles Weaver embraced the idea, prepared a bill, "and within a
month after the introduction obtained House passage by a vote of
115 to 14.
Despite taking the fast track to passage in theS •House,
24
time ran out before the Senate could give the bill consideration.
As the fiscal disparities debate revived in the beginning of
1971, challenges to passage remained. 25 As expected, there
continued to be opposition from those communities who
anticipated they would fare better "with a go-it-alone approach. 26
Moreover, although the bill applied only to the seven-county Twin
Cities area, rural legislators were forced to align themselves with
one side of the debate. 27 Some legislators outside of the Twin Cities
metropolitan area (known as "outstate" or Greater Minnesota)
worried voting "for the Weaver bill could be construed as a vote for
regionalism"-a concept of significant controversy in Greater
Minnesota. s
On July 13, 1971, two days before the House would pass the
bill, an article in the Minneapolis Star explained that the fiscal
disparities legislation appeared to be in trouble because many
Democrats said that they would not be voting for it.29 According to
20.
21.

Id. at 50.
Id.; Idea Caught on Quickly, Many Key Participants,CITIZENS

LEAGUE NEWS,

July 1971, at 3.
22. Gilje, supra note 13, at 50.
23. Id. Rep. Weaver chaired a legislative subcommittee on fiscal disparities.
Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. See generally Steven Dornfeld, Dakota County Officials Protest Tax-Sharing
Plan for Metro Area, MINNEAPOLIS TRIB., Apr. 18, 1971, at 10A (discussing the
opposition the bill faced from the Dakota County Development Association).
27. Gilje, supra note 13, at 50. See Peter Ackerberg, Tax-Base Sharing Likely for
Area, MINNEAPOLIS STAR,July 8, 1971, at IA. The bill applied only to communities

with a population greater than 2,500. Id.
28.

29.

Gilje, supra note 13, at 50.
Deborah Howell, 'Disparities'Bill in Trouble?, MINNEAPOLIS

STAR, July

13,
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the article, the bill had become "enmeshed in controversy over
other bills.",30 There did not initially appear to be great support on
the other side of the aisle either.
Representative Joseph Graw, a conservative House member
from Bloomington, argued that the loss of tax base some
communities would suffer under the bill might reduce their ability
to borrow money.3 2 Rep. Graw said, "This is not a fiscal disparities
bill. It's a share the wealth bill., 33 And Graw argued the bill could
because
discourage communities from seeking new developments
14
cited
Graw
growth.
of
the
a
portion
from
benefit
they would not
figures prepared by the House research staff showing that
Minneapolis would gain $515,000 a year in new tax revenue, St.
Paul would gain $617,000 and Bloomington, his home district,
Weaver replied thatS . any36 figures on who
would lose $97,000.
would gain and who would lose were misleading. Weaver argued
that individual communities would gain in some years and lose in
others, depending on their respective stages of development.3 7 The
idea behind the bill was to mitigate the "winner take all" situation
that then prevailed when, for example, a new shopping center was
38
built in a community.
From the metropolitan area, strong opposition to the bill came
from Dakota County. 39 G.F. Minea, representative of the Dakota
County Development Association, equated the proposed legislation
with "metropolitan socialism.,

40

Minea believed tax-base sharing

was "feeding weaker communities with the product of the work of
1971, at 6A.
30. Id. Rep. Martin Sabo, then Minneapolis House DFL minority leader and
a cosponsor of Weaver's bill, said he and other Democrats would "not vote for the
bill because of an 'indefinable frustration' over actions of the House conservatives
on taxes and the refusal of the conservative leadership to permit some other bills
to reach the House floor." Id.
31. Id. (noting that Weaver had 57 conservative votes, but estimated he had
"lost a few" and needed DFL votes for passage).
32. Ackerberg, supranote 27.
33. Disparities Bill Gets First OK, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Mar. 31,
1971, at 35.
34. Ackerberg, supranote 27.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Dornfeld, supranote 26.
40. Id.
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others.'
Minea wondered: "Why should those who wish to work
share with those who won't or can't help
be forced 4to
2
themselves?,

The House passed Senate File 10 on July 15, 1971. 43 While it
appears that the House had an overwhelming majority voting in
favor of the legislation, especially compared to the Senate's onevote margin, the minority House Democrats almost defeated the
bill. The final vote was 83 to 39.44 Surprisingly, the vast majority of
45
outstate House members voted for the bill, perhaps due to
Weaver, a well-respected legislator who was never previously
considered to be pro-metropolitan. Victory for Wayne Popham,
Weaver's coauthor in the Senate, proved to be far more difficult.
B. Voting in the Senate: No Room for Conservative vs. Liberal-This Was
About Money
Senate supporters of Minnesota's fiscal disparities legislation
built coalitions of support based on municipal fiscal health rather
than party identification. Like House author Charles Weaver,
Senate author Wayne Popham (from Minneapolis) was also a
conservative, while Governor Wendell Anderson, who also
46
supported the fiscal disparities legislation, was a Democrat.
Conservatives who supported the legislation heard from their
constituents that the bill "amounts to metropolitan socialism.
Liberals who were against the legislation, such as Senator George
Conzemius, spoke from a traditional conservative stance,
complaining that the legislation would, "discourage
efforts by
48
communities to work for industrial development."
The rural opposition became particularly apparent on the
41.
42.

Id.
Id.

43.

JOURNAL OF THE HouSE,67th Leg., at 331 (Minn. 1971).

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Pat Pheifer, Charles R. Weaver Sr., Former State Representative, Dies at 60,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 21, 1992, at 1B (quoting former Gov. Wendell
Anderson recalling, with regard to the fiscal disparities bill, that "[t]ogether we
were able to get the support to pass it").
47. See Dornfeld, supra note 26 (quoting Dakota County Development
Association's representative G.F. Minea's statement to the Urban Affairs
Committee).
48. Robert J. O'Keefe, Senate Passes Disparities Bill, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS
(Minn.),June 2, 1971.
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floor of the Senate where, on final passage, opponents came close
to garnering enough votes from outstate Senators to kill the bill.49
The Minneapolis Star noted that "several rural senators, many of
them opposed to the regional approach
to solving problems,joined
50
the suburban senators in opposition."
As in the House, Dakota County also voiced displeasure in the
Senate debates. 5'
Sen. George Conzemius, a Cannon Falls
Democrat who represented southern Dakota County, said that his
county had property taxes that ranked among the highest in the
metropolitan area, but still would lose tax dollars under the bill.52
Conzemius also contended that it would "discourage communities
that have gone out and worked to encourage commercial
development. 53 G.F. Minea further criticized the fiscal disparities
bill during the Senate's committee hearing, stating bills such as
Senator Popham's are like "Robin Hood, they take from the
progressive communities such as Dakota County and give to the so",54
called backward ones.
Senator Popham disputed the claim that communities would
lose the incentive to attract commercial development, noting that
they would retain more than half of the tax base 5 Senator Joseph
O'Neill, a conservative from St. Paul, encouraged suburban
senators to look beyond the short-term losses their areas might
56
experience.
O'Neill urged suburban senators to look forward,
warning that their communities would be susceptible to "the same
urban blight and reconstruction cycle" that the core cities were
experiencing at the time. 57

The Senate passed Senate File 10 on June 1, 1971.58 The bill
needed thirty-four affirmative votes to pass, and it received exactly
that with a final vote of 34 to 31.59 Of the thirty-four affirmative
49.

Tax-Base PoolBill Advances, supra note 1.

50.
51.

Id.

METROPOLITICS, supra note 9, at 143.
52. Steven Dornfeld, Metro Tax-Base-Sharing Bill Squeezes Through Senate,
MINNEAPOLIs TRiB.,June 2, 1971, at IA.
53. Id.
54. Peter Ackerberg, Fiscal Disparity ProposalDelayed, MINNEAPOLis TRIB., Apr.
17, 1971, at 14B.
55. Dornfeld, supra note 52.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 67th Leg., 1st Extra Sess., at 50-51 (Minn. 1971).
59. Id.
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votes, seventeen were from conservatives and seventeen were from
Democrats. 6° Of the thirty-one negative votes, fifteen were from
conservatives and sixteen were Democrats.6'
Twelve suburban
senators and nineteen representing
districts
outside the
bill.62
Metropolitan area opposed the
III. SUMMARY OF THE MINNESOTA FISCAL DISPARITIES ACT OF 1971

The Fiscal Disparities Act, officially known as the Metropolitan
Revenue Distribution Act, 6 states six main objectives:
1.

To provide a way for local governments to share in the
resources generated by the growth of the area, without
removing any resources which local governments
already have;

2.

To increase
the likelihood of orderly urban
development by reducing the impact of fiscal
considerations on the location of business and
residential growth and of highways, transit facilities and
airports;

3.

To establish incentives for all parts of the area to work
for the growth of the area as a whole;

4.

To provide a way whereby the area's resources can be
made available within and through the existing system
of local governments and local decision making;

5.

To help communities in different
stages of
development
by making resources
increasingly
available to communities at those early stages of
development and redevelopment when financial
pressures on them are the greatest; and

6.

To

encourage

protection

of the

environment

by

60. Dornfeld, supra note 52.
61.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Act of July 23, 1971, ch. 24, §§ 1-13, 1971 Minn. Laws 2286 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 473F (2004)).
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reducing the impact of fiscal considerations so that
flood plains can be protected and land for parks and
open space can be preserved. 64
The Twin Cities fiscal 65disparities program identifies a sevencounty metropolitan area, which is guided by a metropolitan
administrative auditor who is charged with making calculations
The auditor specifies
relating to the distribution of valuations.
the base year (1971 for the Twin Cities program) for considering
value of commercial-industrial property and prescribes how
increases' in commercial-industrial valuation shall be treated in
67
The Act then designates forty percent of the
subsequent years.
commercial industrial growth as the "area-wide tax base." 68S •69This
base is distributed to municipalities on the basis of population.
Unlike separate programs that distribute state revenues to
counties, cities, townships, and special districts, tax-base sharing
simply redistributes the common base from which each local
jurisdiction derives its revenues.7 ° It helps to equalize the resources
available 71to local governments without removing local control over
tax rates. And by requiring local governments to relinquish some
of their fiscal dividend from new commercial-industrial
development, tax-base sharing weakens their incentive to waste
72
taxpayer dollars by stealing it away from other communities.
Similarly, including residential property in tax-base sharing dilutes
local governments' incentives to use fiscal zoning or its substitutes
64. MINN. STAT. § 473F.01 (2004). The bill's authors included a seventh
objective in the original language: "To provide for the distribution to
municipalities of additional revenues generated within the area or from outside
sources pursuant to other legislation." HINZE & BAKER, supra note 2, at 5 n.1. This
final objective was ultimately repealed because it referred to an aspect of the
program that was never enacted. Id.
65. MINN. STAT. § 473F.02, subdiv. 2 (defining "area" generally as Anoka,
Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington counties).
66. Id. § 473F.03.
67. Id. § 473F.06.
68. Id. § 473F.07, subdiv. 1.
69. Id. at subdiv. 3.
70. See id. §§ 473F.07-.08 (explaining the methods for tax-base sharing
calculations and distributions).
71. Note, Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal DisparitiesAct-An Experiment in Tax
Base Sharing,59 MINN. L. REv. 927, 954-60 (1975) (discussing the possible effects
that the Fiscal Disparities Act might have on the development of the seven-county
metropolitan area).
72. See id.
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to restrict residential development to "profitable" types of housing,
making efficient land-use planning easier.7"
IV. BENEFITS OF TAX-BASE SHARING
Minnesota's
experience illustrates the positive impact of tax. 74
base sharing. In the Twin Cities area in the early 1970s, reformers
seeking to pass legislation for metropolitan land-use planning
employed tax-base sharing as a quid pro quo to garner political
support in the low-fiscal-capacity, developing suburbs. v
The
central concern for developing suburbs was the perceived need to
increase their tax base through land development.76 Faced with
school overcrowding and the need to keep tax rates down,
developing suburbs saw urban service lines-which decreased the
amount of developable land by zoning areas outside urban service
lines as agricultural-as severely limiting their ability to increase
their iax base.77 Not surprisingly, these communities were initially
extremely reluctant to acceIt an exchange of land-use planning for
regional tax-based sharing.
But when it was demonstrated that
they would share in the metropolitan region's tax base, and as a
result, gain fiscal capacity per capita faster than they would by
developing residential property, a compromise
and final
79
acceptance of the plan eventually emerged.
Flexibility is another advantage of tax-base sharing. Tax-base
sharing allows for the offsetting of intraregional variations in public
service needs and costs, as well as distinct variations in revenueraising capacity between communities."
This system allows a
73. SeeJanice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505,
532-33 (2005) (explaining that the sharing formula of the Fiscal Disparities Act
provides disincentives to zoning property for commercial and industrial
purposes).
74. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supranote 13, at 106.
75. Id. (citing Alan Dale Albert, Sharing Suburbia's Wealth: The Political
Economy of Tax Base Sharing in Minnesota's Twin Cities Metropolitan Area (Mar.
1979) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Harvard College) (on file with State of Minnesota
Reference Library)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. This can be achieved without altering the disincentives for tax-base
competition since only the distribution formula need be changed to achieve this
result. Id. n.19.
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regional implementation of aid formulas to both rural and urban
areas, each with vastly different needs and costs. 2 A true advantage
of this regional approach is that such varying needs can be
addressed simultaneously, and also avoid mitigation issues.
The tax-base sharing system requires that a portion of each of
the region's communities contribute a portion of its tax base to a
regional pool. s4 The collective pool is then redistributed back to
the communities according to set criteria other than the original
contribution rate. s 5 A community's contribution can be set as a
percentage of growth in tax base or as a percentage of total tax
base. s 6 The tax-base pool can be limited to particular types of tax
base (e.g., commercial-industrial
property), or
it can include all
•
87
types-sales tax, income tax, and property tax. Distributions from
the pool can be determined by tax capacity, service cost or need
indicators, land-use decisions, or other criteria.88 The essential
features of tax-base sharing are that: (1) it distributes tax base or
revenues by criteria other than the origin or collection point
(unlike piggyback taxes, for instance); (2) it provides resources for
the full range of local services (unlike special district assessments);
and (3) it provides additional resources for the provision of local
services (unlike county or state taxes). 9
The program's broad design balances local autonomy with
regional interests.90 Specifically, by taxing part of commercial
industry at a consistent regional rate, it is focused on narrowing
business tax-rate disparities among municipalities. 9' And it also
provides local discretion by permitting each locality to establish the
rate at which it taxes its distribution from the pool.
82.

Id. at 106.

83.

Id.

84. Id. The program can be structured in a way that both allows localities to
tax their distribution from the pool at local tax rates and taxes the pooled portion
of the regional tax base at a uniform rate. The former maintains local control over
tax rates while the latter narrows inter-local tax rate disparities. Id. n.20.
85. Id. at 106.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 106-07.
90. Id. at 107.
91. Id.
92. Id. See HINZE & BAKER, supra note 2, at 5-6. See also Thomas Luce, Regional
Tax Base Sharing: The Twin Cities Experience, in LOcAL GOVERNMENT TAx AND LAND
USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 234, 246-49 (Helen E. Ladd ed., 1998).
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In 2000, the Twin Cities program shared about twenty-eight
percent of the region's commercial-industrial tax base-an amount
that represented roughly twelve percent of the total tax base. 9 This
percentage of the commercial-industrial tax would have generated
revenue of approximately $300 million at the regional average
rate. 94 As a result of the sharing program, local tax-base disparities
narrowed significantly (by roughly twenty percent) and the ratio of
the ninety-fifth to fifth percentile tax base saw a similar decrease
(approximately twenty-five percent) .9 For cities with a population
of at least 9,000, the ratio of the largest to the smallest tax base per
capita dropped as a result of the tax-sharing program from 16-to-i
to 4-to-i.
V.

ESTABLISHING TAx-BASE SHARING IN OTHER METROPOLITAN

AREAS

Not all tax reform systems are as good as others. Some school
aid systems give too much to rural areas, promoting sprawl. At their
best, such systems should be based on need/capacity and should
deter competition, promoting equity and supporting land-use
planning.
Policies promoting greater equality by introducing reform
measures designed to balance the distribution of regional tax
The
revenue sources are often controversial and divisive. 97
9s Those
and
losers.
of
winners
creation
the
appearance projects
fearing the introduction of equity-enhancing measures typically
argue that they will not only have direct losses, but also that more
general losses will emerge, resulting from a less efficient regional
economy and public sector.99 Despite this argument, tax capacity
and cluster analyses demonstrate that because resources are so
imbalanced in metropolitan areas, winners are far more likely to

93. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 107 (citing
supranote 2, at 52).

HINZE

& BAKER,

Id. at 107.
Id.
Paul A. Gilje, Minnesota's Tax Base Sharing Law Isn't Broken; Don't Fix It,
MINN. JOURNAL: A PUBLIC POLICY MONTHLY FROM THE CITIZENS LEAGUE (Citizens
94.
95.
96.

League, Mpls., MN), May 25, 2004, at 2.
97. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 108.

98.
99.

Id.
Id. See also Ackerberg, supra note 27, at 2A.

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:2

outnumber losers.0 0 Nor need we "appeal to unenlightened selfinterest" for support of sharing programs. ° Coupling institutional
reform with proper aid and tax-base sharing programs offers not
only efficiency gains, but also equity benefits.
Advocates of institutional reform often cite resulting
efficiency.' °
Government should design and finance public
services on a "scale commensurate with the scope of their costs and
benefits."l°4 If they are not designed on the appropriate scale, then
local and regional interests diverge.0 5 When a metropolitan region
relies exclusively on a system of strict local control, waste is likel , to
result in a number of areas, including wasteful tax-base
competition 06 and excessive depletion of water and other natural
resources, 0 7 including the over-consumption of land.1 0 8 Not to be
overlooked is the segregation 100and concentration of impoverished
populations in specific areas.
Combined, these areas of waste
increase the social and public costs of income inequality."0 Such
models of governance run counter to a growing body of research,
which suggests a tie between suburban growth and the economic
health of central cities."' Further, strict local control of land-use
planning promotes a myopic, inward focus to the development of
the locality resulting in an increase in the physical
separation
2
between rich and poor segments of the population."
Similarly, policymakers can design aid and tax-base-sharing
programs to enhance the efficiency of both local and regional
100.
See AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 110. This analysis holds
true for even the most modest of revenue-growth-sharing proposals. Id. See also
Note, The Minnesota Fiscal DisparitiesAct: A Model for Growth-Sharingin the 1 980s, 9
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 410, 411-13 (1983) (discussing land use problems created
by fiscal disparities).
101.
AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 110.
102. Id. See also METROPOLITICS, supra note 9, at 84-87.
103. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 110.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.

109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing ALAN

ALTSHULER ET AL.,

GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY IN

METROPOLITAN AMERICA 34-36 (Alan Altshuler et al. eds., 1999)).

112. Id. (citing William A. Fischel, Does the American Way of Zoning Cause the
Suburbs of Metropolitan Areas to Be Too Spread Out?, in GOVERNANCE AND OPPORTUNITY
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 151-91 (Alan Altshuler et al. eds., 1999)).
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13
economies as well as the public sector, thereby improving equity.
Key to designing successful programs (and thereby reducing waste)
is the ability to adequately diminish the connection between
growth of certain land uses and the tax base made available to
produce local services. 1 4
One such example would include
providing financial incentives focusing on development types which
truly generate regional benefits, but lack in providing local fiscal
dividends.'5
The introduction of changes to traditional policies need not
be radical. 16 It is important to keep in mind that all states provide
financial support in some form to local governments.I 7 Reform
modifications to current policies can begin with modest,
incremental changes to the allocation of current state aid."' As the
Twin Cities program demonstrates, regional tax-base sharing
programs can be designed to capture a portion of the growth in the
tax base as opposed to capturing a portion of the existing tax base.
The result is an immediate benefit to the region via greater
efficiencies and diminishing the impact of redistributive growth." 9
Reform to traditional approaches does not necessarily
mandate conceiving of a new regional government from whole
cloth."' Rather, cooperative arrangements on regional issues such
as water management or transportation are the likely building
blocks for future reform measures.121
If taxes are raised-particularly income taxes-to buy down
property taxes, almost everyone wins-except high-income
individuals. While income tax is widely considered to be the fairest
tax, it is often the least popular tax with some of the most powerful
people in our society, and it is perhaps the hardest political tax to
increase. Ironically, low- and moderate-income individuals are
quite distrustful of the income tax as well. Not surprisingly, raising
the income tax was not a popular proposition in Minnesota.122

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. By identifying and promoting such regional entities, the functioning
of regional housing and labor markets will improve. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., JIM JAFFE & MICHELLE BAZIE, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
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Other sorts of general-purpose taxes are sales tax, real estate
transfer taxes, or property taxes (a state-wide power equalizer).
Generally, Republicans and moderate Democrats who have signed
tax pledges resist these types of approaches.12 3 Most politicians that
have run on direct pledges to raise taxes have lost-although many
of them have done so after they were elected.
Those who
propose tax reform after an election have bipartisan cover and
often get the support of the business community if there is a strong
governor and legislative leadership. 125
Tax sharing sometimes stimulates the need to raises taxes.126
But tax-base sharing both improves services and lowers taxes in
most jurisdictions.
Metropolitan tax-base sharing makes sense for
each of the three major sub-regions of a metropolitan area: at-risk
suburbs (suburbs with stagnant or declining tax-base), bedroomdeveloping suburbs (suburbs with relatively little commercial and
industrial tax-base) and affluent job centers (sub-region with high
commercial and industrial tax-base).
A.

At-Risk Suburbs

Regional tax equity means, to the older suburbs, what
everyone promises in American politics, but almost no one can
deliver: lower taxes and better services. 12 This is especially true in
at-risk suburbs, which have high tax rates when compared to the
public services these communities provide.1 29 Often, without
substantial state-supported school equity, taxes in at-risk suburbs
can be the highest in metropolitan America 3 In property-taxPRIORITIES, STATE TAX SYSTEMS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY INEQUITABLE, http://
www.cbpp.org/1-15-02sfp-pr.htm (describing the increasingly regressive nature of
tax schemes) (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
123. See, e.g., The Americans for Tax Reform State Pledge, available at http://
www.atr.org/content/pdf/pre2004/state-pledge-blank.pdf (requiring a promise

to "oppose and vote against any and all efforts to increase taxes").
124. See Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation, 55 BurF. L. REv. (forthcoming
2007). The states of Kentucky, Michigan, Texas (under George W. Bush), and
Alabama provide recent examples of this tax-pledge phenomenon. Id. In Illinois,
Governor Jim Edgar raised taxes despite committing to a previous no-tax-hike
pledge, but nonetheless defeated challenger state senator Dawn Clark Netsch. Id.

125.

Id.

126.

See AMERICAN METROPOLITICS , supra note 13.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164
Id. at 163-64.
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sharing simulations conducted throughout the country, older
suburbs appear to be the largest net gainers of resources of any of
the subregions. "
With new equity resources, at-risk suburbs could become much
more competitive in the metropolitan
economy by providing
• 1 "l •132
essential services while possibly reducing tax rates.
Many of these
communities face enormous and overdue tasks such as the
maintenance of old infrastructure, expensive sewer separation
projects, public facility upgrades, brownfield clean-up, declining
neighborhood housing, and abandoned commercial and industrial
facilities.' Such new resources could not only address these issues
but also help underfunded schools and, depending on the breadth
of the equity, such measures
could be implemented as the local tax
134
rates were being lowered.
B. Bedroom-DevelopingSuburbs'35
Bedroom-developing suburbs, in addition to common interests
in the health of the entire region, have three compelling bases to
support regional cooperation.3
First, it will reduce taxes and
increase services, most notably in the area of education. 3 7 Second,
it will help them build the infrastructure needed for
development.
Finally, regional cooperation offers "a better
alternative to local unilateral growth moratoriums or slow-growth
action to respond to the increasingly negative" 39reaction within these
,
communities to the development status quo.

Twenty-six percent of the population of U.S. regions lives in
rapidly developing communities with a very high ratio of school-age
children to households. 14 Without significant commercial capacity
131. Id. at 164.
132. Id. HINZE & BAKER, supra note 2, at 6 (stating, "[t]ax-base sharing
equalizes the imbalance between some local governments' public service needs
and financial resources").
133. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supranote 13, at 164.
134. Id.
135. Bedroom-developing suburbs are the prototypical suburb, with a mostly
white population, low-density new housing, and a below-average tax capacity. Id.
at 42.
136. Id. at 168.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 34.
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and with only a small number of local jobs, these communities' tax
bases depend chiefly on residential property taxes.
As a result,
these communities often suffer from inadequate transportation
and sewage infrastructure in addition
to low per-pupil spending
S • 142
and stressed or inadequate schools.
Coupled with these restraints
is the realization that few jobs are available locally, which results in
long distance commutes for the community's residents. 143
Understandably, many of those facing such
conditions
are
•
144
questioning the status quo pattern of development.
Of the
suburban jurisdictions that are entirely or partly within political
swing districts, 45 fifty percent are moderate-capacity high-growth
municipalities
(containing
percent of the population of
. ..
.
.
. thirty-four
.
146
political swing municipalities).
Although this group has the
second-highest number of political 47swing districts, it also has the
highest proportion of such districts.
While bedroom-developing suburbs are comparatively lowpoverty and low-diversity communities, their children-to-household
ratio is high; sometimes two to three times higher than in the
developed core.4 4 Given that school funding is the most expensive
public service a community can provide, a high children-tohousehold ratio results in a greater financial burden on each

141. See generally id. at 88 (stating that the amount of revenue a locality can
generate depends largely on the value of the land within its jurisdiction). To
make matters worse, commercial and industrial properties are generally believed
to be a source of profit for the area, because commercial and industrial properties
pay more in taxes than they use in terms of service provided. HINZE & BAKER, supra
note 2, at 6.
142. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 168.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Swing districts are defined as "legislative districts that regularly switch
from one political party to the other." Id. at 3. Swing districts indicate a "political
environment ripe for reform." Id. "About 80 percent of the swing districts in the
25 largest U.S. metropolitan regions are in fiscally or socially stressed suburban
communities, which makes them true pivot points of American politics." Id. at 34. Swing districts are most frequently located in the at-risk and bedroomdeveloping suburbs. Id. at 153.
146. Id. at 158-60.
147. See id.; see also id. at 168 (stating that, together, the at-risk communities
and the bedroom-developing suburbs represent two-thirds of the swing districts,
and of these districts, forty-three percent are bedroom-developing communities).
148. Id. at 168. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, the at-risk low density and the
bedroom-developing suburbs "have a 25 percent higher ratio of children per
household than the central city." Id. at 42.
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household.1 49 Having to account for such costs, it should not be
surprising that many of these rapidly developing communities are
in school districts with some of the lowest per-pupil spending.150 In
an effort to deal with significant shortfalls in school equity, these
communities resort to establishing high property taxes and
As a result, their
significant reductions in school spending.1
children often attend school in packed classrooms, or52 even in
trailers, because they cannot afford to build new schools.
Through the use of school equity and other forms of tax
sharing, bedroom-developing suburbs and at-risk suburbs are
These
among the largest recipients of aid per student.153
communities are likely to use regional fiscal equity to provide both
The
additional funding to schools and to lower taxes. 154
combination of higher spending and lower taxes is a tough
combination in American politics. 55 As a result, "[o]nce a system
of significant school aids is established, both Democratic and
Republican legislative leadership will compete to see which party
can give the most money to developing suburban school
districts."15 6
C. Affluent Job Centers
With increased road congestion and the seemingly endless
consumption of regional open spaces, many of the nation's
metropolitan job centers are revolting against what has become
1' Tax-base sharing will
typical or status quo regional development.
give these affluent job centers, 58 like the bedroom-developing
149.

Id. at 168.

150.

Id.

151. Id. at 168-69. See also HINZE & BAKER, supra note 2, at 5-6 (stating that
"[c]ommunities with low tax bases must impose higher tax rates to deliver the
"In states without a
same services as communities with higher tax bases").
significant aid system for equalizing the resources available to school districts, such
as Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, these districts have extremely low spending,
high school taxes, or both." AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 43.
152. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 42-43 (stating that during the
1990s, Georgia students who lived in communities without the tax base or
resources to build new schools had to attend schools set up in trailers).
153. Id. at 169.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 171.
158. Affluent job centers are considered "the most attractive communities in a
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suburbs, a far more effective growth-management regime, keeping
them closer to the urban edge and less likely to be surrounded by
sprawling development, than they are experiencing with local
moratoriums. 159 Moreover, for the disproportionate number of
regional business leaders and managers who live in these
communities, tax-base sharing provides a more economically
prosperous region. 160
With only about seven percent of regional residents and few
political swing districts, the affluent job centers comprise a very
small portion of metropolitan regions. 16
These localities are
distinct from many other regional communities in two respects:
they have very little poverty and their fiscal capacity
is generally
162
more than twice that of the regional average.
Similar to
communities on the urban fringe, affluent job centers grow
quickly, while also keeping the child-per-household number at the
regional164average.
The result is less strain on the locality's school
system.

Despite these advantages, affluent job centers in some ways
may be a victim of their own success. With a high concentration of
jobs and their status as centers of job growth, these localities are
often troubled by increased traffic congestion. 65 As property values
increase and developable land becomes increasingly scarce, the
pressure to develop remaining open space• mounts
and efforts
166
toward land preservation become more difficult.
In certain cases
across the country, many of these edge localities approach
congestion and density rates rivaling those of central business

region." Id. at 3. They create a steady flow ofjobs, contain upscale retail outlets
and expensive housing developments. Id. But they also have congested roads and
the constant consumption of the remaining open spaces. Id.
159. Id. at 171. See also HINZE & BAKER, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that tax-base
sharing decreases local competition in attracting commercial and industrial
properties which in turn discourages urban sprawl).
160. AMERICAN METROPOLITICS, supra note 13, at 171.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165.

Id. Even though affluent job centers account for only seven percent of

population, they account for seventeen percent of office space. Id. at 45. This is

nearly two-and-a-half times their fair share, and more than four times the amount
of any other group of suburbs. Id.
166. Id.171-72
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districts."' Without a regional cooperative approach, it becomes
exceedingly difficult for these localities to adequately address these
negative externalies.
In many cases, the solution sought by affluent job centers is an
anti-growth ballot initiative. 69 The result is a battle between the
status-quo development pattern and alternative development
patterns with a regional perspective that account for a neighboring
community's poor planning decisions."O It is argued that regional
cooperation is the only real way to truly address regional concerns,
such as the maintenance of a suburban-to-rural edge and 7 the
development of workable plans to deal with traffic congestion.
Finally, it is important to consider that a metropolitan region's
economic leaders will often reside in these localities.1 2 The central
concern with many of these community leaders is the economic
health and prospects for growth of the region's economy."' Over
time, it has become clearer that areas with economically healthy
central cities also have stronger growth models.7 4 Such urban
vibrancy appears to have a direct influence on the health of the
nation's economy as well.175 It is likely that affluent job centers will
support regional cooperation when the community's economic
leaders and resident's from affluent job centers understand the
connection between the health of1 the
76 region's economy and health
of all of the region's communities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

All parts of a metropolitan area can benefit from a tax-base
sharing program. As Minnesota demonstrated both in 1971 and
today, regional cooperation is not an easy proposition. But if a
region is faced with growing educational and economic disparity,
there are two viable options: either allow the disparity to deepen or
167.
168.
169.
willing
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 172.
Id.
Id. Often, residents in the affluent job centers are highly educated and
to stand up for themselves. Id. at 45.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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work to find solutions that can benefit all. As in Minnesota's case,
this may require forming new alliances. Political cooperation
indeed must be the first step towards regional cooperation.

